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NON-IDENTITY, EQUITY AND EXPLOITATION 
 
Suppose our country faces a powerful enemy, and we face a choice between 
building up our army or acquiring nuclear weapons. We decide to build the bomb. 
Because nuclear deterrence proves effective, some wars never break out, saving many 
lives. Young men who would have been drafted get jobs in missile factories or in the 
civilian sector. All this affects which people meet, with whom they mate, and the 
moment that they conceive, resulting in children genetically different from those who 
would have been born under a non-nuclear policy. These children mate with others in 
the population. Within a few generations, the genetic makeup of nearly the whole 
country is different than it would have been without the bomb. After eight generations 
of peace, a war breaks out and kills two-thirds of the population. Every succeeding 
generation struggles to survive in a brutish and polluted world. 
It seems we have committed a grave injustice. We bought ourselves and our 
descendants eight generations of peace at the price of a nuclear war. We may not have 
wronged the people who were living at the time of the war: They too stood to gain 
from the peace-inducing effects of nuclear deterrence, but had bad luck. You pays 
your money and you takes your chance. Every following generation, however, enters 
a damaged world.
1
 This seems unfair indeed. But wait. The survivors of the nuclear 
holocaust are not the same people as would have been born had we opted for 
conventional deterrence. Other people would have been born instead. So long as they 
find their blighted lives worth living, perhaps they should even be grateful to us for 
building nuclear weapons, since it was the only chance they had to live at all!  
 2 
Philosophers will recognize this as an example of what Derek Parfit calls the 
non-identity problem. All wide-scale public policies affect who is born and who is 
not. Unless we make future people‟s lives so bad as to be not worth living, we will not 
harm them by making them worse off.
2
 Why, then, should we object to nuclear 
deterrence or ravaging the environment? We might try to resolve the puzzle by casting 
our duties in impersonal utilitarian terms. We should prefer the best outcome for 
future people, whoever those future people may be. But, as Parfit has shown, such 
attempts run into serious difficulties. Suppose we think we ought to maximize total 
utility across generations. This might oblige us to have children whenever an extra 
child would increase overall utility. Moreover, while total utilitarianism would forbid 
us from making future people‟s lives so bad as to be not worth living, it would not 
preclude making people‟s lives barely worth living. Indeed, the way to maximize total 
utility might be to create the Z-world of Parfit‟s famous Repugnant Conclusion: an 
enormous population whose sum utility was high due merely to their numbers. 
Average utilitarianism—which holds that we should seek to maximize utility per 
person—also leads to troublesome problems.3  
Contractarianism offers a more promising approach. Parties contracting from 
behind Rawls‟s veil of ignorance, it can be argued, would not choose policies that 
impoverished future generations.
4
 Nevertheless, some theorists, including Parfit 
himself, doubt that original position arguments apply to the intergenerational context.
5
 
Finally, some have argued that policies such as depleting resources violate future 
people‟s rights. If everyone deserves certain basic resources or opportunities—e.g., 
literacy, or enough to eat—this goes some way toward solving the non-identity 
problem.
6
 But insofar as such arguments focus on such basic needs, they seem too 
undemanding.  They explain why we should not reduce future generations to 
 3 
destitution, but not why it would be wrong to leave them much poorer than ourselves. 
In any case, it may seem a challenge to show that we violate future generations‟ rights 
unless we make them worse off—and this is the very assumption the non-identity 
problem calls into question.
7
 Related to this, there is the problem of the waiver.  We 
usually believe that people can waive their rights. Might not an entire future 
generation, knowing that our reckless policies were a condition of its members‟ 
existence, collectively “waive” its rights, retrospectively indemnifying us from all 
blame?
8
   
In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on 
distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in 
our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles.
9
 
First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we 
believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of 
well-being. This is consistent with what is known as the sufficiency view. Third, we 
believe children should receive their fair share of benefits and burdens. It is wrong to 
take more than our share, even if we do not reduce them to disease or destitution, and 
even if they would willingly waive their rights. When groups are threatened with 
extortion, we often render their rights inalienable. We should do so here. The rights of 
our descendants are not ones we would allow them to “waive.” 
These are plausible population principles not only toward our own children, 
but also toward more distant generations. In addition, they capture many people‟s 
intuitions about animals. Some people argue that we do animals a favor by raising and 
eating them. I argue that here too we ought to ensure that as large a proportion as 
possible enjoy lives well worth living. In contrast to humans, most animals do not 
seek to accumulate beyond the level of sufficiency. Fairness requires only that their 
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lives should be sufficient. The lives of many farm animals, however, are not 
sufficient. Moreover, much animal husbandry indirectly risks bringing both people 
and wild animals below sufficiency. By causing wild and domesticated animals to 
lead impoverished lives—and profiting at their expense—we take more than our fair 
share, just as we do from future people. 
I. FAILING TO PROVIDE ENOUGH 
In a famous example, Parfit asks us to consider a fourteen year old girl who is 
thinking of having a baby. By having a child while she is herself so young, “she gives 
her child a bad start in life.” Our instinct is to tell the girl that having the baby would 
be wrong. Nevertheless, so long as the child‟s life is worth living, she cannot be said 
to harm him—indeed, for her to conceive now provides the only chance for this child 
to live at all. We might justify our objection by claiming that if one can choose 
between creating two individuals, one should create the happier of the two. Suppose, 
however, the 14-year-old girl learns that she will become sterile at age 15. Now it is a 
question of creating different numbers of people.
10
 If she does not have a baby now, 
she never will. No children are available for adoption, or ever will be. Her child‟s life 
will be worth living. He will not be worse off as a result of her action. We may still 
think that the girl should not have the baby.
11
 Why not? 
James Woodward‟s answer is that parents owe their children obligations that a 
fourteen-year old may not be able to perform.
12
 Others formulate this as an objection 
to causing future people to have “restricted lives,” or lives that are “seriously 
defective,” even if they are still worth living. This approach reflects our intuition that 
there are basic needs—such as food and shelter, or adequate parenting—that all 
people deserve to have met. In Kavka‟s words, “high priority should be given to 
providing all with the means to live at least a minimally decent life and engage in the 
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major activities of human and community living.”13 This resembles the sufficiency 
view of distributive justice. Sufficientarians are not concerned with equality, but 
rather that everyone should have enough. This is more than just scraping by; a 
satisfactory life should “include many genuinely valuable elements” and “be deeply 
satisfying.”14 At the same time, sufficientarianism does not require us to have the best 
children possible.
15
 The main obligation is to do enough. This matches everyday 
practice in childrearing, and is prima facie plausible as a population principle. 
A. A SUFFICIENTARIAN POPULATION PRINCIPLE 
What population policies does the sufficiency view imply? We can agree that we 
should avoid bringing people into the world whose lives are not worth living, such as 
infants suffering from Tay-Sachs disease or the direst poverty.
16
 Nevertheless, a few 
wretched people will inevitably be born, as well as some people whose lives, for 
reasons beyond our control, fall below sufficiency. Our goal cannot be simply to 
minimize the absolute number of people with insufficient lives. The most reliable way 
to do that would be to have no children at all. Maximizing the absolute number above 
the sufficiency threshold is less clearly implausible, and goes some way toward 
satisfying utilitarian intuitions without entailing the Repugnant Conclusion.
17
 It does 
not require all people to have children, because this would place too great a burden on 
prospective parents, leading to many lives that fell short of being “deeply satisfying.” 
However, it does tell us to promote “a world overpopulated with individuals just 
above sufficiency, and perhaps containing many far below that line, over a less 
crowded world where everybody is very well off.”18  This seems hard to accept. 
Maximizing the proportion of people above sufficiency seems more plausible, if 
only as a rough cut.
19
 We might propose the following lexical principle: 
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S1: (1) Minimize the proportion of lives not worth living. (2) Maximize 
the proportion of sufficient lives. 
That requires us neither to turn the world into Mumbai nor to have no children at all. 
However, it risks being too hard on existing people. Suppose I have four children, 
Amy, Beatrix, Charles and David. Amy and Beatrix are healthy and happy, but 
Charles and David are seriously handicapped. The proportion above sufficiency is 
thus 2/4. My boss gives me a sizable raise. I could use it to pay for expensive home 
care that would allow either Charles or David to lead a sufficient life, bringing the 
proportion to ¾. But there is another option. I could use the money to have five 
additional children, all of whom I expect to be healthy and happy. This would bring 
the proportion to 7/9. On the proportionate sufficiency criterion, I ought to do this.  
Most people will think I ought to help Charles or David instead. So long as we 
are dealing with cases involving the same number of people, the proportionate 
sufficiency criterion gives the right answer. But if we can create new sufficient 
people, this risks swamping our obligation to bring existing people above sufficiency. 
We ought to give some kind of priority to those already living.
20
 At the same time, we 
must not deliberately create new people whose lives fall below sufficiency in order to 
raise existing people above it. It would be wrong, for example, to have an additional 
child so as to put her to work in a sweatshop to pay for Charles or David‟s treatment. 
We might propose, again in lexical order, 
S2: (1) Minimize the proportion of all lives not worth living. (2) Bring 
existing lives above sufficiency in preference to adding new ones. (3) 
Maximize the proportion of new lives that are sufficient. 
S2 protects existing people without endangering new ones. But it would sharply 
limit the number of new people below the sufficiency threshold. Is this too 
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demanding? Let us return to the fourteen-year-old girl. We may agree that the girl 
should wait if she can later have a different child whose life will be sufficient.  But if 
she cannot, opposing the mere addition of a person whose life is still worth living may 
seem perverse.
21
 Similarly, we may think it is bad that wretched people, such as Tay-
Sachs sufferers or the victims of the Ethiopian famine, ever live. We may believe that 
if we can bring insufficient people above the sufficiency threshold, we ought to do so. 
But if it is not possible to bring all the latter above the threshold, it may not seem bad 
that they ever live. We might then favor 
S3: (1) Minimize the proportion of all lives not worth living. (2) Bring 
existing lives above sufficiency in preference to adding new ones. (3) Of 
new lives that can be sufficient, maximize the proportion that are.  
S3 would not preclude the mere addition of people with restricted lives. Yet it 
too evades the Repugnant Conclusion. Let us set the Sufficiency threshold just below 
Cuba, and the Misery threshold just above the Ethiopian Famine (the choice of 
countries is notional and should not be taken too seriously): 
Sweden 
 
USA 
 
Cuba__________________________________________________ SUFFICIENCY 
 
Nicaragua 
 
Bangladesh 
_______________________________________________________MISERY 
Ethiopian Famine 
FIGURE 1: SUFFICIENCY AND MISERY 
We should not want Ethiopians to be born below the Misery threshold. But we may 
believe it is not bad for Bangladeshis to be born below the Sufficiency threshold. If 
so, it is good for Swedes or Americans, who are well above the threshold, to help 
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them. But it would be wrong to ask Cubans to do the same. This ensures that we will 
not end up, through continuous redistribution, as one big Bangladesh.  
This is what Parfit calls an Elitist version of the Lexical View. He worries that 
such views could lead us to reject redistribution from impoverished Europeans to 
starving Africans.
22
 Sufficientarianism indeed falls short in explaining our duties to 
existing people because in its preoccupation with bringing people above the 
sufficiency threshold, it is insensitive to the needs of those who are far below it.
 23
 But 
as a population principle, the sufficiency view works better. We should not deny food 
to starving people. If Africans are starving, it might be good for Cubans and poorer 
Europeans to help them. But we can think it bad that starving people are ever born. 
While it may not be bad for impoverished Bangladeshis to be born, it would not be 
good for Cubans to aid them if this left the latter themselves impoverished.
24
 We may, 
however, consider it unfair that some should live just above the sufficiency line and 
others well below it. If so, this is a reason to adopt S2 rather than S3, thus minimizing 
the number of people who fall below sufficiency.  
B. SUFFICIENCY DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH 
The real problem with the sufficiency approach is that it fails to explain how, 
without making people‟s lives “restricted” or “seriously defective,” we can still act 
wrongly.
25
 Even some critics of demanding theories of intergenerational justice may 
concede that it could “be unfair of any generation to take advantage of the fact that it 
happened to arrive earlier in time in order to use up supplies of critical natural capital 
to the point that future generations would be reduced to dire poverty.”26 Yet this offers 
no objection to actions that deprive future people without leaving them below 
sufficiency. Take Kavka‟s example of a pill that, when taken before intercourse, 
heightens sexual pleasure, but causes a mild birth defect—say, a missing thumb. The 
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resulting child has not been made worse off, because pausing to swallow the pill 
affects the genetic makeup of the child who is conceived.
27
 Nor is life without a 
thumb seriously defective or restricted. The objection is that the outcome for future 
people should have been better, not that it is absolutely bad.
28
 
Some analysts argue that we can wrong people, even if we do not harm them. 
Rahul Kumar gives the example of a drunk driver who nearly hits a pedestrian.
29
 It is 
true that the driver wrongs the latter even if she has no time to be frightened. The 
drunk driver, however, exposes everyone in the neighborhood to the risk of harm. The 
risk of harm is itself a sort of harm—as our willingness to pay to avoid it shows.30 If, 
on the other hand, we moderately reduce future generations‟ standard of living, these 
individuals are never even at risk of being worse off than they would otherwise have 
been. If we had not acted as we did, they would never have existed at all. While our 
behavior might reveal a lack of respect,
31
 this does not really seem to get at the nub. 
When a drunk nearly runs you down, are you mad because he disrespected you? 
II. TAKING MORE THAN OUR SHARE 
We need a theory that allows us to criticize choices like taking the pleasure 
pill. Kavka provides a clue. He presents the example of a couple who accept the offer 
to produce a child in order to sell him into slavery. The child‟s life, while hard, will 
still be worth living. Indeed, he might give his retroactive consent to the decision, 
“waiving” his right to freedom. Nevertheless, the couple‟s action is wrong. Why? 
Kavka gives two answers. First, the slave boy‟s life will fall below the minimum level 
of quality that everyone‟s life ought to attain—in other words, sufficiency. But a 
second reason is that the parents are “exploit[ing] their unearned position of control 
over life for others to, in a sense, „extort‟ an unfair price for the exercise of those 
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powers.”32 While the slave boy might retrospectively “waive” his right to freedom in 
exchange for the opportunity to exist, this is not a fair bargain for the couple to make. 
Part of Kavka‟s objection is that it uses the slave child as the means to an 
end.
33
 It is this Kantian dimension on which Parfit focused in a 1982 critique. Parfit 
concluded that the argument offers no objection to resource depletion or burying 
nuclear waste, since in such cases we are not using future people at all.
34
 But Kavka‟s 
objection to extracting a waiver from the slave child is not only that it does not show 
respect for persons. It is also unfair. It is like discovering water during a drought and 
selling it at extortionate prices. Such actions “strike us as wrong because [they] extort 
an excessive (and unearned) price...[for] the benefit of existence....The fact that such 
agreement would have been forthcoming under such coercive circumstances does not 
imply that the agreement is a fair one.”35 The couple has misappropriated a benefit 
from their child (whoever that child might be), creating an inequity. 
A. A TYPOLOGY OF INTERGENERATIONAL (IN)JUSTICE 
The most widely accepted definition of exploitation is that of taking unfair 
advantage—often of the party‟s weakness, desperation or ignorance. Failing to show 
respect for persons and taking more than one deserves are two ways sometimes cited 
of doing this.
36
 Having the slave child is exploitative in both ways. On the one hand, 
he is treated as a means to an end. But the couple also deprives the boy of his 
birthright of freedom in order to enrich themselves. Exploitation can occur even when 
the exploited party benefits from, and would voluntarily consent to, the transaction. 
The victim may even gain more than the exploiter. A doctor who overcharges for a 
life-saving operation exploits the patient even though the latter benefits more. The 
exploited party receives less than she deserves according to the relevant “fairness 
baseline.” An action that does not harm a party can still exploit her.37  
 11 
Similarly, the mother who takes the pleasure pill takes more than her share 
from the mother-child relationship. A child without a thumb need not suffer a 
restricted or defective life. Rather, by demanding he “waive” his right to his finger, 
the mother exacts an extortionate price. The same considerations apply in Parfit‟s 
example of Paula and Petra, both of whom know they may bear a handicapped child. 
Paula can avoid the handicap by delaying conception at the cost of some 
inconvenience; Petra‟s child will be handicapped whenever she conceives.38 Let us 
assume the handicap is not a severe one. For Paula to have the child now would seem 
to be wrong, whereas we are unlikely to condemn Petra. Why? Petra neither produces 
a child with an insufficient life nor takes unfair advantage. By putting her own 
convenience before the wellbeing of her child, Paula, in contrast, takes something that 
she ought not to take. She thus misappropriates a good at the child‟s expense 
(whoever that child may become). 
When we bring people below the minimum and take more than we deserve, 
our actions are especially bad. James Woodward asks us to imagine a chemical plant 
owned by Acme Corporation which cannot be operated profitably unless it disposes of 
pollutants in a dangerous fashion. Two people meet each other at the plant and 
conceive a child. The boy develops cancer as a result of the pollutants.  His life is still 
worth living, and without the pollutants, this boy would never have been born. 
Nevertheless, Acme‟s action was egregiously wrong. Why? One answer is that cancer 
deprives children of the sort of childhood that we believe every child ought to have.
39
 
But another is that Acme took unfair advantage at the boy‟s expense. Acme‟s action 
is thus worse than that of Parfit‟s fourteen-year-old girl. Both actions result in a child 
whose condition falls below minimum standards. Nevertheless, the girl‟s choice 
seems as much unfortunate as actually wrong. While sharp words might pass when 
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we learn of her pregnancy, our chief response ought to be compassion and assistance. 
In contrast, we will throw the book at Acme Corporation. In large part this is because 
Acme‟s action was selfish. Suppose that, after having the baby, the girl steals and 
squanders a poor family‟s savings, thus depriving their future child of a good start in 
life. Again, the theft will be likely to determine that child‟s identity, but this time we 
will judge her action much more harshly. Like Acme, she will not only have caused a 
child to lack a good start in life, but also taken more than her share. 
Finally, when parents neither risk neglecting their children nor taking unfair 
advantage, we generally approve of their decision to conceive. Consider the case, 
adapted from Doran Smolkin, of a poor couple who decide to have a baby.
40
 The 
couple earns enough to provide the child with all the basic necessities, but she will 
have to work from the age of fourteen to support the family, and will not enjoy all the 
pleasures and advantages that a middle class couple could provide. Indeed, her overall 
welfare may fall below of that of the child without a thumb. Nevertheless, the 
couple‟s decision is unobjectionable. Imagine that the couple provided their daughter 
with the same minimum conditions as before, but used her earnings to buy themselves 
luxuries. Now we would condemn them, because they would be exploiting her. 
 Equity Inequity 
Below Sufficiency 14-Year-Old Girl Slave-Child Couple 
Acme Company  
Above Sufficiency Petra 
Poor Couple 
Pleasure Pill 
Paula  
 
FIGURE 2: TYPES OF INTERGENERATIONAL (IN)JUSTICE 
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Thinking of the slave child case in terms of exploitation casts light on a 
puzzle: If even a slave‟s life is worth living, why would we condemn the couple for 
bearing a child to sell him into slavery, but not for remaining childless?
41
 Parfit‟s 
answer is that while it would be permissible not to have a child, if they do choose to 
have a child, they ought to have a free one. Similarly, Parfit continues, one may justly 
refuse to save a stranger‟s arms at great cost to oneself, but if one does decide to do 
so, it would be wrong to save one arm when one could as easily save both.
42
 This is 
true even if the stranger prefers to have one of his arms saved to neither. Compare 
Alan Wertheimer‟s distinction between just and exploitative marriages. We do not 
believe people are obliged to marry. But if they do marry, we think they ought to 
share the burdens of marriage equally. It is not enough to say that a spouse who is 
forced to assume more than her share of the work prefers even an exploitative 
marriage to no marriage at all.
43
  
Why? Wertheimer‟s answer is that a decision to marry shifts the moral 
standard we apply. Cooperation often creates a “social surplus”—gains to be divided 
among the parties. “Any transaction or relationship that creates a social surplus gives 
rise to a new moral feature—fairness or unfairness—that does not arise outside of that 
transaction or relationship.” According to what is now a widely accepted “fairness 
baseline,” spouses should share the housework.44 The same consideration arises in the 
case of the slave child. Couples have no obligation to create the social surplus of a 
human life. But if they do so, they must not appropriate an unfair share. The decision 
to save the stranger‟s arms also creates a new moral feature. But in this case, the 
baseline against which we measure the rescuer‟s decision is not fairness, but 
beneficence. As Parfit says, it would be “grossly perverse” to refuse to maximize the 
social surplus at no cost, and to save only one arm when one could save two.
45
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B. THE FAIR SHARE OF FUTURE PEOPLE 
We have seen that we should, in lexical priority, (1) minimize the proportion of 
all lives not worth living; (2) not add new people if this prevents us from increasing 
the number of existing lives above sufficiency; (3) maximize either the proportion of 
new lives above sufficiency, or the proportion of new lives that can be lived above 
sufficiency. The parents of the Slave Child act consistently with (1) and (2). But by 
choosing to have a slave child rather than a free one, they violate (3). Moreover, they 
profit from doing so. To profit by deliberately violating an obligation is to take unfair 
advantage. And by demanding that the child “waive” his birthright of freedom, they 
misappropriate part of the social surplus from his creation. The Slave Child‟s parents 
not only fail to provide him a sufficient life, but exploit him as well. 
Bringing future people below sufficiency is not the only way we can wrong 
them. As we saw with the pleasure pill, we can also take more than our share. How do 
we know what our fair share is? Alan Wertheimer suggests that a rough cut for the 
baseline is offered by the market price. “The competitive market price,” he observes, 
is a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of particular 
defects in the other party's decision-making capacity or special 
vulnerabilities in the other party's situation. It is a price at which the 
specific parties to this particular transaction do not receive greater value 
than they would receive if they did not encounter each other. It may or 
may not be a "just price," all things considered, but it may well be a 
nonexploitative price, for neither party takes unfair advantage of the other 
party.
46
 
Demanding something as a quid pro quo that is normally given away for free can be a 
form of exploitation. We will look askance at a rescuer who demands a large sum of 
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money, because our baseline is that rescuers should not expect recompense at all.
47
  If 
the rescue is dangerous or costly, we might understand demand for compensation, but 
certainly not if all it involves is throwing a rope from the river bank. 
For the mother who takes the pleasure pill or Acme Corporation to demand a 
“waiver” as the price of being born a particular person is demanding something for 
which there is no market price. “Agree to let us poison you,” Acme says to the boy, 
“or we‟ll see that your parents give birth to someone else instead.” There is no market 
rate for causing some people to exist and not others. It costs us nothing, and we do it 
all the time for free.
48
 To insist on concessions is like insisting on being paid for 
throwing in the rope. Moreover, the “bargain” Acme strikes with the boy does not 
even produce a social surplus. Instead, Acme‟s role is purely parasitic, like a trustee 
who transfers an inheritance to one heir rather than to another because the former 
offers him a cut of the proceeds. Both the trustee and the heir benefit from the deal, 
but only because the deal determines the heir‟s identity.  
The parents of the Slave Child, in contrast, are deciding whether to have a 
baby. They do this at some cost to themselves, and in creating a new life, they create a 
social surplus. They may legitimately expect something in return. The problem is that 
they demand too much. “For the couple to both sell their prospective child into 
slavery and justify this act on the grounds that the child benefits,” Kavka observes, 
may be viewed as similar to an act of indirect extortion. To offer such a 
justification is tantamount to saying, "This is a bargain that the child or 
its guardian would have agreed to, hence there is nothing wrong with the 
corresponding act."…. [Yet] human existence, and the power to create it, 
[are not] commodities that may be sold for whatever the market will 
bear.
49
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While many employers drive the hardest bargain they can, most parents demand less 
from their children than the child might be prepared to pay. Mr. Murdstone may do 
hard by his employees, but by Wertheimer‟s criteria he is not taking special advantage 
of them.
50
 By putting his own stepson to work sorting bottles, in contrast, Murdstone 
exploits David Copperfield by the standards of Victorian middle-class society. The 
norm, to be sure, varies drastically across time and place. But in no society does 
selling oneself into slavery amount to the market rate for being born. 
C. CAN WE EXPLOIT DISTANT GENERATIONS? 
We can exploit our children. Can we also exploit our distant descendants? If 
we define exploitation merely as taking unfair advantage, then certainly we can. 
“[T]here are cases,” asserts Alan Wertheimer, “in which the exploitee may be entirely 
passive. A may sell photographs of B without B's knowledge, or rob a purse from a 
sleeping B or follow B's taillights in a dense fog.”51 Defined in this broad sense, 
exploitation could involve appropriating an unfair share of benefits, or externalizing 
an unfair share of costs.
52
 Most commonly, however, we think of exploitation as using 
people. We cannot do this to our distant descendants. As Christopher Bertram 
observes, “in the case where generations do not overlap it is hard to see that benefiting 
from the actions of future generations is even possible.”53  
Bertram argues that it is still possible to exploit distant future generations. Just 
as within a group of contemporaries, shirkers exploit their counterparts, so too in a 
long-term intergenerational enterprise, such as a family firm, one generation can 
exploit another. “It seems odd and arbitrary,” he observes, “to allow the fact that 
activities take place non-contemporaneously to affect that judgment.”54 This argument 
overlooks a key distinction. When one worker shirks her duties, she takes more than 
her share of the proceeds from cooperation. In contrast, we cannot appropriate a single 
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penny from any social surplus produced from interaction with our descendants. 
Moreover, as Bertram points out, many of the ways that we benefit at future people‟s 
expense, such as despoiling the environment, involve no cooperation at all.
55
   
Rather than exploiting our distant descendants, perhaps we should say that we 
can profit unjustly at their expense. Justice entails more than a fair division of a social 
surplus. It also means the fair distribution of inherited goods. We cheat distant 
generations by depriving them of their just inheritance. How we determine what that 
just inheritance is depends, in turn, on our theory of distributive justice. An 
entitlement theory such as Nozick‟s will give a different account than an end-state 
theory à la Rawls.
56
 Egalitarian theories of other stripes will give still other answers.
57
 
The important point is that we can abuse our position in time to take unfair advantage 
not only of our children, but also of our distant descendants.
58
  Like Acme and the 
mother who takes the pleasure pill, we rob them of health or wealth that they deserve 
to inherit. 
III. THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF FUTURE PEOPLE 
Robbery harms the victim and benefits no one but the robber. On the logic of 
the non-identity problem, however, our actions do not harm future people, and may 
even benefit them by causing them to exist. Some have suggested that they would 
waive their rights, even if our actions brought their lives below sufficiency. “It is 
arguable,” Jeff McMahan suggests, “that conceiving a person with a life below the 
minimum but above zero would not constitute a violation of his rights at all. For, if 
the person is later glad that he was conceived, this might be regarded as tantamount to 
his retroactively waiving his right.”59 
Jeffrey Reiman has recently argued that the waiver argument misconstrues the 
interests of our descendants. He proposes that we imagine people in an original 
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position representing all people who are alive today and all people who will live in the 
future. They would have no interest in becoming any particular people. Hence they 
would “insist that it is unjust to make the price of some particular individual's existing 
that that person waive his or her right not to be negatively affected. Then it is clear, 
however, that such a waiver would be obtained under duress: that is, by an unjust 
albeit retroactive threat, namely, the threat of not existing.”60 Reiman‟s argument is an 
ingenious one that understates its own implications. Not only would future people in 
the original position consider it unjust to demand that they accept a birth defect in 
exchange for existing. It would also be an empty threat. “Give me your finger,” says 
the mother, “or I won‟t decide to have you.” “So what?” says the potential child. “If 
you have a child at another time, I‟ll just become somebody else.” Since, as Reiman 
argues, potential people would have no prior interest in becoming one or another 
individual independent of that person‟s properties—such as health or wealth—they 
could laugh in the blackmailer‟s face. Nevertheless, some doubt that such original 
position arguments work in the case of future people. We can refute the “waiver” 
argument without appealing to them. 
Part of why we object to the mother‟s demand may have to do with a belief that 
bodily integrity is something that should never be bought or sold. For similar reasons, 
some object to the sale of body organs. However, we routinely pay people to engage 
in dangerous work, and allow them to endanger or alter their bodies for far more 
frivolous reasons—e.g., hanggliding or plastic surgery. Why not let them sell their 
kidneys?
61
 A stronger objection to organ sales is that they are exploitative. Donors 
may gain, but not gain as much as they should have from the social surplus of the 
interaction. Indians who sell their kidneys for as little as $1,000—when U.S. 
healthcare providers could pay up to $100,000 and still break even, due to the savings 
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they make on long-term dialysis—are being taken for a ride.62 Similarly, sweatshop 
workers can gain and still be exploited, because their employers should have paid 
them more.
63
 Even if these particular workers would never have been hired but for the 
low wage, workers as a class are getting a raw deal. By the same token, individuals 
blackmailed into “waiving” their freedom or fingers gain, in comparison with never 
being born. But children as a class receive too little from this “transaction.” 
A. WHY FUTURE PEOPLE COULD NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHTS 
 We can now see why future people would not be allowed to “waive” their 
rights. Suppose, to borrow Arthur Kuflik‟s example,64 we face a housing shortage, 
with more prospective tenants than apartments to go around. If tenants are allowed to 
waive their right to a minimally habitable apartment, we are apt to see a race to the 
bottom. Some would-be renters will sign away their rights in exchange for being 
offered a fleapit. If the housing shortage is extreme, allowing waivers might result in 
an entirely different population of tenants. If so, no identifiable tenant will be worse 
off. Indeed, each tenant may be glad she could waive her rights. Yet if we allow 
waivers, landlords still do better than they deserve, and tenants as a class do worse. 
By proscribing such bargains, we prevent landlords from exploiting their tenants. 
Suppose that potential people were willing to waive their rights in order to become the 
earth‟s tenants. We would rightly forbid them from doing so.   
One might object, “Yours is a false analogy. If some tenants snap up apartments 
below code, other people are denied them. The latter are merely possible tenants, but 
real people. These people are harmed. If we impoverish future generations, the 
possible people will never exist at all.” Do we object merely on behalf of the “other 
people”? Consider Joel Feinberg‟s example of a pair of scalpers who buy a tickets to a 
baseball game for which demand exceeds supply. Feinberg has trouble seeing whom 
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their action harms. Not the owners of the team, who got the price they demanded for 
the tickets. Not the scalpers, who made a fast buck from a few hours spent in line. But 
not the buyers either. If not for the scalpers, other people would have got the tickets. 
The buyers are delighted to pay through the nose.
65
 Does that mean we cannot object 
to scalping?  
Perhaps we can. Market transactions normally entail a social surplus. Sellers sell 
for more than the minimum they would be willing to accept, and buyers pay less than 
the maximum they are prepared to give. Rightly or wrongly, it is widely assumed that 
buyers deserve a share of this benefit. In this case, however, the scalpers have “stolen” 
part of the buyers‟ consumer surplus. In doing so they have also determined who the 
buyers are. Certainly, the buyers will not object. But all the same, it may be that 
scalpers do better than they deserve and buyers as a class do worse. Similarly, we can 
take more than our share from future people as a group rather than as individuals. 
When people‟s rights are threatened by extortion, we often render them 
inalienable. Such rights protect vulnerable people not just as individuals, but also as 
groups. Indeed, the right to a minimum wage may exclude less capable workers from 
the labor market by forbidding them to sell their labor on the cheap.
66
 In such cases, 
Russell Hardin observes, 
the members of a relevant class are potentially pitted against each other 
to their collective harm, and the only way to secure them against that 
collective harm is to deny them singly the right to free ride on the 
abstinence of other members of the class. If one holds...that a right is for 
the benefit of the right holder, one might find it odd that, when it is ever 
invoked, it is actually invoked to stop the right holder from acting in a 
particular way....The notion of an inalienable right is somehow 
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contradictory if it is seen as an individual right. It makes sense only at 
the group level because whatever benefit comes to an individual under 
the right comes indirectly through its effects on the relevant larger 
class.
67
 
The same goes for future people. Forbidding them to waive their rights excludes 
some from existence, but ensures equity toward future people as a group. 
IV. THE LOGIC OF THE LARDER 
 Acme Corporation and the pleasure pill are what Parfit calls Same Number 
Choices. While they affect who is born, there is no reason to think that they affect how 
many people are born. In contrast, the Fourteen-Year-Old Girl and the Slave Child 
may be Different Number Choices. If the agents do not have the child in question, 
they may have no child at all. Another Different Number case is the raising of 
domesticated animals. Unless we raise and eat them, many fewer such animals will 
exist. “Surely,” observes James Sterba, “it would benefit farm animals to be brought 
into existence, maintained under healthy conditions, and hence not in the numbers 
sustainable only with factory farms, but then killed relatively painlessly and eaten, 
rather than that they not be brought into existence or maintained at all.”68  
 Some hold that killing animals violates their rights. Robert Nozick points out 
that we would not raise children for food on the ground that “the child will not exist at 
all if this is not allowed; and surely it is better for it to exist for some number of 
years….An existing person has claims, even against those whose purpose in creating 
him was to violate those claims.”69 Nozick does not specify exactly what these claims 
are, but it is likely that he would cite the child‟s natural right to “life, health, liberty, 
or possessions.” Yet adults will have children whether or not they can eat them. 
Indeed, Swift makes his Modest Proposal because they are having too many. The 
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same is true in the case of cats and dogs. Someone who insists on eating his dog is 
charging above the market rate. For most people pigs have less to offer.
70
 Suppose we 
were grant pigs a right not to be killed. A few people would continue to raise them as 
pets, and some would survive on “tamelife” reservations, but the vast majority would 
disappear.
71
 
 This may not trouble us. As Tom Regan says, “[t]he rights view never claims, 
and does not imply, that the quality of life of individual farm animals is logically or 
causally tied to there being vast numbers of them. This is not true in the case of the 
quality of life of individual human beings.”72 The purpose of rights, on any theory that 
applies to animals, is to protect the bearers‟ interests. The right to life would protect 
those pigs who were born. Perhaps that is all that is needed. Any guardians of these 
pigs would not waive their rights. But do the numbers really not count at all? A right 
that results in the disappearance of the vast majority of the rights-bearers is an odd 
one. 
 Alternatively, utilitarians might argue that animal husbandry often reduces or 
degrades land and other resources available to wild animals. This has spawned a 
debate over whether such farming increases or reduces animal numbers, and thus total 
utility.
73
 Yet a population theory built on total utilitarianism risks not only obliging us 
to have children but entailing the Repugnant Conclusion.
74
 It could also require us to 
maximize the number of happy animals. Not only might this mean raising animals in 
place of people, but we might be obliged to invest our resources in projects like 
breeding mice.
75
 Finally, total utilitarianism implies that moderately intensive factory 
farming could be preferable to nonintensive farming methods because the sheer 
number of animals would maximize utility—a Repugnant Conclusion for animals.76    
A. SUFFICIENCY FOR ANIMALS 
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 Just as in the case of people, here too sufficiency seems a better guide.
77
 Some 
farm animals‟ lives may not be worth living at all.78 This seems likely to be true, for 
example, of crated veal calves. But it is harder to believe that most sheep‟s or cattle‟s 
lives are so bad as to entail negative utility. What seems clear is that many of these 
animals‟ lives are insufficient. While they may be worth living, they are not well 
worth living.
79
 The life of a steer on a feedlot can scarcely “include many genuinely 
valuable elements” and “be deeply satisfying.” We should maximize the proportion of 
human lives above sufficiency. Assuming we can raise animals with sufficient lives, 
we should do that too. Some may question whether any animals can ever reach 
sufficiency. If a sufficient life must be “deeply satisfying,” and we believe with Mill 
that “[i]t is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied,” it seems that 
pigs must be worse off than even some insufficient people.
 80
  Such arguments, 
however, seem bizarrely anthropocentric. They both overlook the likelihood that 
animals have sources of satisfaction that we ourselves lack, and assume that animals 
measure shared sources of satisfaction, such as food, with the same yardstick.
81
  
 Abandoning factory farming will cause a rise in the price of meat and milk, 
and a fall in domesticated animals‟ numbers. Moreover, even if our breeding and use 
of such animals benefits them overall, S2 and S3 both forbid us to add new individuals 
if it brings existing ones below sufficiency. Turning wilderness into pasture land for 
cattle does this to many existing animals and some existing humans. While in some 
cases it may raise other humans above sufficiency, growing vegetable crops normally 
provides more food. Finally, domesticated animals are also a source of carbon 
emissions whose climatic effects threaten both existing humans and animals. Cutting 
back their numbers is an ethical no-brainer, all the more because the biggest 
consumers are usually well above the sufficiency threshold.
82
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B. SUFFICIENCY IS FAIRNESS FOR ANIMALS 
Sufficiency does not exhaust our duties. We must provide both humans and 
non-humans not only enough, but also their fair share. One way to define this is by 
the “market rate.” Defining exploitation merely as taking unusual advantage, 
however, risks suggesting that any pervasive practice—such as running sweatshops—
cannot be exploitative.  The problem, as Ruth Sample points out, is that while 
Wertheimer‟s definition of the “fairness baseline” permits criticism of abnormal 
transactions, it precludes criticism of the norms themselves.
83
 American agribusiness 
has persuaded state legislatures to define anti-cruelty laws to exclude any practices, 
however painful, standard in the industry. In 1993 a Pennsylvania court convicted a 
group of cruelty on the grounds that they had not shown, first, that they were engaged 
in raising horses for meat, and, second, that starving them was standard business 
practice. “The defendants‟ problem was not that they starved horses, but that they 
could not prove that enough people were doing the same thing.”84 That practices are 
standard does not make them fair. 
On a Marxist view, moreover, all capitalist labor markets are exploitative, 
because the owners‟ control of the means of production enables them to expropriate 
the social surplus from cooperation.
85
 Analogously, might the control of the means 
both of production and reproduction allow farmers to extort more than their share of 
the social surplus from animals? As late as the Renaissance, many domesticated 
animals in Europe roamed largely free. The enclosure of common lands and rise of 
intensive farming have created an industrial proletariat. Like Marx‟s workers, this 
proletariat sees “their lives…sustained solely to serve purposes external to them, 
conditions and means for the acquisition and exercise of their species-powers…denied 
to them, and, more specifically, their social needs and capacities…systematically 
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denied and suppressed.” 86 Morever, “where the human laborer may receive a wage, 
the animal who is involved in production cannot meaningfully receive any wage 
beyond its means of subsistence....[T]he entirety of their production is oriented toward 
the needs of their owners, and the goal is maximal profit.”87 When owners turn a 
profit, they appropriate the surplus value from the animals‟ production. Even if they 
deserve some share of the proceeds in exchange for “management,” aren‟t they asking 
too much? 
 Both humans and some animals consider territory and certain things “theirs.” 
Some animals work to accumulate, such as bees making honey or a squirrel collecting 
nuts. We might condemn a hiker for stealing a squirrel‟s nuts on the grounds that it 
was unfair to deprive the squirrel of all his hard work. Suppose, however, the squirrel 
still has plenty of nuts left for the winter. We are then unlikely to care. The squirrel 
may not care much either, or at any rate not for very long. Most animals work to 
ensure sufficiency. For them, unlike humans, it really does seem to be enough. Insofar 
as this is the case, ensuring sufficiency seems to exhaust our duties toward animals. 
We have an obligation to provide them their fair share of the social surplus our 
interactions produce.
88
 But if all they can receive is their “means of subsistence,” that 
is all their fair share can be, provided we understand “subsistence” as sufficiency.  
Few if any animals raised in factory farms receive it.  Living far above 
sufficiency, producers and consumers in rich countries exploit literally billions of 
animal workers living far below.
89
 Moreover, animal husbandry, through its 
ecological effects, threatens to reduce many other people and animals below the 
sufficiency threshold. The sufficiency principle is enough to mandate radical change 
in our farming practices, and possibly a wholly vegan diet.  
V. THREE TYPES OF INJUSTICE 
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Most work on population ethics seeks to place it in a utilitarian framework. 
This seems to me a mistake.  In our everyday reproductive decisions, we do not 
consider ourselves obliged to maximize utility—even utility above some minimum 
level. Rather, we aim to ensure sufficiency and fairness. Correspondingly, we can 
wrong future people and animals in least three ways. We can cause them to lead lives 
that are not worth living. We can cause them to lead lives that unnecessarily fall 
below the threshold of sufficiency. Or we can cause them to lead lives in which they 
receive less than their fair share. Such acts are wrong regardless of whether the 
particular victims gain or lose from our actions. Nor could victims “waive” their 
rights. We must avoid taking unfair advantage of people and animals as a class. The 
non-identity problem provides no obstacle to condemning it. 
Yet there are strong incentives for the present generation to take more than its 
share, and good reasons to believe this is occurring.
90
 While future people may be 
richer than we are, some of our actions risk making them worse off or even bringing 
them below sufficiency.
91
 Already we profit from the exploitation of billions of 
animals. Recognizing the exploitative character of these abuses allows us to situate 
them in a broader body of progressive and radical theory. Yet such an analysis also 
helps us to see the peculiar obstacles that efforts to overcome them confront. Neither 
future people nor animals can organize on their own behalf, or impose significant 
costs on their oppressors. Unlike exploited humans living today, they are almost 
entirely dependent on our goodwill.
92
 If people respond to moral suasion, or can be 
brought to identify with future people strongly, exposing the exploitative nature of our 
existing practices may help to change them.
93
 If not, the outlook may be bleak for 
animals and future generations. 
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